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\
Edwin Lieuwen
MEN ON HORSEBACK:
LATIN AMERICAN MILITARY ELITES*
ORIGINS OF MILITARISM
"

UNTIL LESS THAN A DECADE AGO, scholars of the Latin American scene
had failed to concern themselves with any kind of systematic study of
the most powerful political institution in the area. This seemingly incredible neglect resulted from the fact that the institution under consideration was military-namely, the armed, forces~and that the
scholars were civilian, and that between the two there existed an
atmosphere of mutual hostility. To the scholars the term military
signified bellicosity, banditry, bloodletting, ~nda kind of reversion to
barbarism. which annoyingly interrupted the normal progress of.civilization. Military men compounded thishostiIity and misunderstanding by displaying a deep distrust for these nonuniformed idealistic outsiders who seemed inordinately Concerned with the utterly. unattainable goals of.peace and democracy. Besides, army officers almost never
wrote books to defend themselves against the vilification of the
scholars.
And yet, much as they despised it, scholars could not completely .
ignore the anrly as a national political force. After all, it was pretty
hard to ignore the fact that in most countries of Latin America one
general or another nearly always seemed to be· sitting in the president's
chair. Without. bothering to investigate this phenomenon of political dominance by military .men carefully, the scholarsm~ a number of facile' deductions to explain it. Observing that ~ 'creators ·of
armies which won the wars for independence from Spain were often
• Part of the material used.in this article has been condensed from the author's
recent books: Arms and Politics in Latin America (New York, 'Council on Foreign
Relations, 1960) and Generals Vs>Pres'idents (New' York: Fredericlc A.Praeger,1964).
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scions of the native landholding aristocracy, ma~y of whorlt had serveJ
in the Spanish army, such as Simon Bolivar.. in Venezuela and ,San
Martfnin Argentina,and that it was the tradition in Western Europe
for the officer corps to be recruited from the landholding aristocracy,
it was simply taken for granted that the post;.independence Latin
American military elites also had close family" ties with the large landholders. This assumption of social identity between the officer corps
and the propertied classes neatly explained why in nineteenth1:entury
Latin America the armed forces always seemed 'to defend the status
quo. Scholarsj in fact, created stereotypes which revealed more about
their hdstility"towards, than their understanqing of, the military's
true social and politiGaI role. For example, a common stereotype POf-,
trayed ~ wealthy land baron with three sons. Since the law of primogeniture still prevailed, the eldest automatically inherited the job of
managing, and preserving intact, the family estate~ The second son
was intelligent and responsible, so he became either a lawyer or" a
priest~ The third, however, was a '1>lack sheep/' and since he WaS"
psychologically. unfit for any respectable calling, he automatically be:---;
came an army officer. If OI~e accepted tbi$: '1>lack sheep" thesis, it was '
then easy to explain why so many of Latin America's nineteenth1:entury dictators were such vicious and irresponsible rogues.
Our tecent questioning of this stereotype,coupled with a more
syste1\laticinvestigation of the actual' role of miljtary elites, has resulted, I believe, in a much more accurate picture of the interrelationships" between, the social structure and political. proc~ses in nine..
teenth,.century Latin America. One of the first things we noted was
the absence of militarynilers whose ,family names were also the
names of ''buenas· famiIias/'" or the propertied aristocra.cy. By doing
a representative series of biographical studies, we found, almost invariably, that the military elites were men of relatively humble social
origins; that they were almost never sons of the land barons. And so,
we now know that the upper1:Iass leaders of the early. nineteenth.' century revolutionary wars against Spain retired from the political
scene soon after independence was achieved. Not only did the upper
c1ilsses not relish risking their, lives in 'the crude jungle of politics, but
, also they had"li~etastefor the hard, dull, routine life of the barracks, "
and lienee theyretfred to their landed estates.
.And thus into leadership of" the new national anriies rose undisciplined amateur soldiers, schooled, only in the violence of t~e long
and bloody revolutionary" struggles-men decidedly of ,.a lower order,
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both socially and. intellectually, than. th~ leaders of the revolution.
For such .men, an army career 'provided the opportunity to· break
through the arbitrary restrictions of the old social order, in 'effect, to
shoot one's .way into a share of _the power, wealth, and prestige enjoyed by the aristocracy.
The officer cQrps possessed little or no concept of the military
career as a legitimate profession. The point here ,iSth~t the sQ-Called
military elites were little more than.hordes of heavily armed politicians ",
during Latin America's first half-century of independence. The plethora of ambitious, opportunistic military men left over from the
Wars of Independence made politics, in nearly every country, little ,
more than a series of internecine militatyconvulsions.~ The struggle
always centered around two buildings: the presidential palace and the
national treasury. Once in power, a 'military president. would take
advantage. of the opportunity to feather his own nes,t, paying. off his
backers with ijle residue. However, the victorious forces seldom had
sufficient resources to distribute spoils to everyone, and so the disgruntled would sow the seeds of a new. military conspiracy. Thus a
vicious ~ycle of revolu~on devflope~. Th "44out'~groups woulcl~ever
7
rest until they had seIZed the presidential palace and the national
treasury. Then would come· the inevitable redistribution. of offices,
~onors, privileges, and spoils~ all ~f" which would last only until the
next: successful revolt.
0\
. ~
.~ .
,\ The revolutions which occurred in Latin America in' this- period
were not mass movements, for the combatants. were limited to· rival
military chieftains and their adherents. Often in the background,
members of the landed oligarchy, or wealthycommercful' groups, .orthe Church hierarchy, would engage in political intrigue with one' or
another military faction, but the overwhelming majority, of the population was not affected. The so-called revolutions of the nineteenth
century, then, were merely palace coups, fights for· the spoils within
the officer corps. When a revolt succeeded, the top government personnel would be supplanted, but for the masses, all that occurred was
a change of masters.
Political control by the military elites did not disturb the economic
and social dominance of the landed a:nd commercial oligarchy~ For
. with the great majority of the populationinarticulate,poverty.:stricken,
and politically apathetic, the militarymlers were undetno popufur
pressure to alter the exjstingsocial system.., nOr did theY .sh.o\Vanyinclination to do so. Throughout the nineteenth century, the militarY
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scions of the native"landholding aristocracy, many of whom had served
in the Spanish army, sriel.! as Simon Bolivar in Venezuela and San
Martin in Argentina, and that it was the tradition in Western Europe
, fof' the officer corps to be recruited from the landholding aristocracy, ,
it 'Wfls silnply taken for granted that the post-independence Latin
, American ,military elites also had close family ties with the large landholders. This assumption of social identity between the officer corps
and the propertied classes neatly explained why in nineteenth-century
Latin America the armed forces always seemed Ito defend the status
. quo. Schola~ infact, created stereotypes which revea1edmore about,
their hos.tility towards, than their understanding of, the military's
true social and political role. For example, a common stereotype portrayed a wealthy lanel baron with three sons. Since, the law of primogeniture still prevailed, the eldest automatically inherited the job of
managing, 'ap.d preserving intact,theiamilyestate. The second son
was intelligent and responsible, so he~ecame either a lawyer or a
priest The thirtt however, was a 4'black sheep," and since he was ._--.'
psychplogi<;ally unfit for any respectable calling, he 'automatically be-.
came an army .officer. If one accepted this l'blacksheep" thesis, it was
then easy to explain why so many of Latin America's nineteenth-century 'dictato~ were such vicious and irresponsible r~gues.
Our recent questioning of this stereotype, coupled with a more
systematic investigation of the actual role of military elites, has resulted, I believe, in much more accurate picture. of the interrelationships' between the social structure and political processes in nineteenth-century Latill Amenca. One of t}le first things we noted was
the absence of military rolers whose family naines were also the
names, of ''buenas- famiIias,'" or the' propertied aristocracy. By doing
a representative series of biographical studies, we found, almost invariably, that the ~ilitary elites were men of relatively humble social
,~rigins; that they were almost never sons of the land barons. And so,
we now know that the upper-class leaders of the ,early n~neteenth, century revolutionary, wars against 'Spain retired from the political
scene SOon after independence was achieved. Not only did the uppd
classes not relish risking their lives in the crode jungle of politics,. but
also' they' had little taste for the hard, dull, routine life of the barracks,
and hence they retired' to their landed estates;
, And. thus into leadership 'of the new national armies rose un-_
.'disciplined amateUIsoldiers, schooled. only' in the violence of the'lo.ng'
and bloody revolutionary s9'Uggles-:-men decidedly of ~ lower order,
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both socially and intellectually, than· the leaders of the revolution.
,. For such men, an army career provided the opportunity to break
through the arbitrary restrictions of the old social. order, in effect,.to
shoot one's way into a share of the power, wealth, and prestige enjoyed by the aristocracy.
The officer corps possessed little or no 'concept of the military
career as a legitimate professiop.; The point here.is that theso-ealled
military elites were little more tpan hordes of heavily armed politicians
during Latin America's first ha1f~entury of independence. The plethora of ambitious, opportunistib military men left over from the
Wars of Independence made politics, in nearly every country, little
more than a series ofintemecine military convulsions. The struggle
always centered around'two buildings: the presidential.palace and the
national treasury. Once in power, a military president would take
advantage of the opportunity, to feather his own nest, paying off his
backers with the residue. However, the victorious forces'seldom had
sufficient resources to distribute spoils to everyone, and sathe disgruntled would sow the seeds of a· new military conspiracy. Thus a
vicious cycle of revoluf\on developed. The "out" groups would never
rest until they had seized the presidential palace and the natronal
treasury. Then would come the ·inevitable redistribution of offices,
honors, privileges, and spoils,. all of which would last only until the
next successful revolt.
The-revolutions which occurred in Latin America iIi: this period
were not mass movements, fOf the combatants-were limited· to rival
military chieftains and their adherents. Often in the bacl<ground,
members of the landed oligarchy, or wealthy commer~ial groups, or
the Church hierarchy, woUld engage in political intrigue with one or
another military faction, but the overwhelming majority of the population was not affected. The s~lled revolutions of the nineteenth
century, then, were merely palace coups, fights for the spoils within
the officer corps. When a revolt succeeded, the topgovemmentper..
son~e1 would be supplanted, but for the masses, all that occurred was
a change of masters.
.
Political control by the nu1itary elites did not disturb the economic
and social dominance of the ldpded and commercial oligarchy. For
with the great majority of thepopuIaooninarticuIate, poverly~stricken,
and politically apathetic, the military'rulets were. under no popUlar
pressure to ~ter the existillg social systeID, D,ordidth~y~ho",anyin, clination to do so. Throughout the nIneteenth century, the military ,
<
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_scions oithe native landholding aristocracy, many of whom had served
in the .Spanish army, such as Simon _Bolivar in Yen~uela and Sail
Martin in Argentina, and that it-was the tradition ''in Western Europe
for the pfficer corps to be recruited from the landholding aristocracy,
it was simply taken for granted that the post-independence Latin
American military elites also had close family ties with the large landholders~ This assumptioI1of social ide1'1tity between the· officer corps
and the propertied classes neatly explained'why in nineteenth-century
Latin America the armed forces always seemed to defend the status
quo. Scholars~ in fact, created stereotypes which revealed, more about
their hostilIty towards, than their understanding of, the military's
true social and political role. For example, a common stereotype por-trayed a wealthy land baron with three sons. Since the law of primogeniture\stiIl prevailed,the eldest automatically inherited the job of
- managing, and preserving intact, the family estate. The second son
was intelligent and responsible, so he became either a lawyer or a
priest The third,. however, was a ('black sheep," and since he was ---~---
psychologiC::allY unfit for any respectable calling, he automa~cally became an army officer. Jf one accepted this ''black sheep" thesis, it was
then easy to explain,why so-many of Latin America's nineteenth-centory dictators were such vicious and irresponsible rogues.
OUI recent questioning of this stereotype; coupled with a more
systematic -investigation of the acluaI role of military elites, has resulted, I believe, ina much more accurate picture of the interrelationships between the' social structure and political processes in nineteenth-century Latin America. One of the first, things we noted was
the absence of lIlilitary mlers whose family names were also the
;nalIles of '1Juenas- £amilias,'" or the propertied aristocraw.By ,doing
fl' representative series of biographical ,studies, we found, almost in.tanably, ,tha~ the military elites were men of relatively humble social
~origins; that they were' almost never sons of the land barons. And so,
we now know that the upper-class leaders of, the ,ear1~l,ninet~enth
ceilturyrevolutionary wars against Spain retired from the political
scene soon after independence was achieved. Not only did the upper
classes not relish risking their lives in the, crude jungle of politics, bilt
also they hadlittle 'taste for the hard, dull, routine life of the barracks;
and hence they retired' to their landed estates.
_
And thus into leadership of the new national armies rose undisciplined3:mat~ur soldiers,-schooled only in the violence of-the long
and bloody revolutionary struggles-men decidedly ofa lower order,
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both socially and intellectually, than' the leaders of the revolution.
For such m.en, an army career provided the opportunity to break ~
through the arbitrary restrictions of the old social order, in effect, to '
shoot" one's way into a share of the power, wealth, and prestige en.
joyed by the aristocracy. I
The officer corps possessed little· or no concept of thelllilitary
career asa legitimate profession. The point here-is that the so-called
military elites were little more than !iordes of heavilyanned politicians
during Latin America's first hali-century of independence. The plethora of ambitious, opportunistic military men left over from the
Wars of Independence made politics, in nearly every country, little
more than a series of internecine military conyulsions..The struggle
always centered around two buildings: the presidential palace .and "the
national treasury. Once in power, a military president woul~ take
advantage of the opportunity to feather his own nest, paying off his
backers with the residue. However, the victorious forces seldom had ~
sufficient resources to .distribute, spoils to everyone, and so the disgruntled would sow the seeds of a new military conspiracy. Thus a
vicious cycle of revolution developed. The "out" .groups wo~ld never
rest until they had seized the presidential palace and the national
treasury. Then would come the inevitable redistribution of offices,
honors, privileges, and spoils, all of which would last only until the
next successful revolt.
The revolutions which occurred in Latin America in' this period
. '. \yere .~ited .to rival.
were not mass moveII\ents, for the combata.nts
military chieftains ana their adherents. Often in the background,
members of the landed oligarchy, or wealthy commercial groups, or
the Church hierarchy" would engage in political intrigue with one or
another military faction, but the Qverwhelming majority of thepopulation was not affected. The so-called revolutions of the nineteenth
century, th~n, were merely palace coups, fights fortbe spoils·wiPtin
.the officer corps. When, a revolt succeeded, tlie top'government p~r-.
sonnel would be supplanted, but for the masses, all that occun-edwas
a change of masters.
'
,
Political control by the military elites did not disturb the economic
and s09ial dominance of the landed and comme:rcialoligarchy. For
with the great majority of the pOPu.lation inarticulate, poverty-strick,en,
and politically apathetic, the military rulers were under 110 popular
pressure to alter the existing socialsysteI1l,nordid t~ey show~nY'in
clination to do so. Throughou~ the. nineteenth centuqr, the·military
.
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elites indeed aspired to upper-class status, ever attempting to use their
political offices to amass fortunes and become landowners themselves.
But the more important consideration here is that they accommodated
themselves to the semifeudal system the new nations had inherited
from the Spanish colonial past. In this generally static social milieu,
the military politicians were about the only ones for whom upward
social mobility was possible.

DECLINE OF MILITARISM

Nb)V, just as in the case of the origins and meaning of Latin Amer-

ican militarism, historians have made some pretty unsatisfactory interpretations concerning the decline of militarism in the second halfcentury of Latin America's independence, namely, the period 18801930. To explain why militarism began to die out in the major countries'in this period, the antimilitary intellectuals used to explain that
.the military elites had simply destroyed themselves in internecine
warfare and that their outrageous excesses-such as their political mismanagement, their peculation, and the like-would simply no longer
be tolerated by the civilians. More sophisticated was the interpretation of the Spencerian school of Latin American historians-scholars
who began to believe in evolutionary laws of history, scholars who
then went on to explain that. the transition from military to civilian
rule was an inevitable and universal historical process. A typical example of this kind of interpretation is found in the work of Peruvian
. historian Francisco Garcia Calder6n who, on the· eve of World War
I, wrote:
Inevitably we find the sequence of two periods, one military and on~
industrial or CiVIl. Independence once realized, the role of militarism
sets in throughout [Latin America]. Mer a period of uncertain duration the military caste is hurled from power, or abdicates withqutviolence, and economic interests become supreme. Politics is then ruled
by "civilism."*
Now this statement describes w~t happened, but it doesn't tell
us very much about why and how. -Vfe don't have all the a~swers yet,
.. F. Garcia Calder6n, Latin America: Its Rise and Progress (London: Fischer Unwin,
191 3),p·86.

https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/nmq/vol34/iss4/2

8

Lieuwen: Men on Horseback: Latin American Military Elites

MEN ON HORSEBACK

but we feel we .are arriving at something very significant in analyzing
the tremendous. European and United States impact, upon Latin
America in the period 1880-1930, and then relating these new foreign
influences to the. decline ofmili~m.Perhapsthe principal consequence of Western'industrial modernizing influences upon underdeveloped areas today is the drastic alteration--sometimes even destruction--of native cultures, folkWays,traditions1 and institutions. In
Latin America this heavy Occidental modernizing impact first hit the
area with force in the period 1880-193o.-Thiswasthe great period of
European 'immigration-principally Italian, Spanish" German, and
Portuguese-and also, this' was tpegreat period of foreign investment
and technological development-principally' British, United States,
and French. In those countries where EUfopean immigrants, Western
technology, and foreign capital flowed in, we see a decline in militarism-in Chile in the 1840's, in Argentina after 1860"ln Colombia at
the tum of the century. And in ~exico, certainly~ there is a relationship between foreign-finatlced economic development and the disciplining, for the first time at the end of the nineteenth 'century, of
that country's armed forces. And in Brazil, this modernizing Occidental impact (immigrants, technology, and capital) did .much to bring
about the collapse' of the Empire. in 1889, and, following a five-year
military interlude, the establishment of orderly republican government. Conversely, in those coUntries where the impact of European
immigration and Western technology was mininial until th~ twentieth
century, such as in Pero, Bolivia, Ven~uela, Guatemala, and Ecuador,
militarism continued.
Another'consequence of foreign influence, which in tum helps explain the decline of militarism in the 1880-193° era, was' the growth
and development of professionalism inside Latin America's anned
forces. Professionalism meant that the officer corps turned its en~r
gies toward the exercising of military rather than political ftinctions,
, toward maintaining internal security and preparingfot defense against
external aggression. And in this process, the Latin American military
. elites began to become the tools rather than the masters of the state.
Again, despite the importance of this phenomenon of professionalism
-for it was the very 'antithesisof militarism--historians and political
scientists ignored it until very recently. We know now that this professionalism'stimulus also came out of Western Europe, that it was
part of the general Occidental impact. upon Latin America in the ' .
1880-193° period. Toward, the end of the nineteenthce~tury,French :,
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and German military missions began introducing modem military
methods and developing prpfessional pride and esprit. The Germans
came to train the Chilean army in 1885 and the Argentine army before the end, of the century, and French officers carried ~ut similar
tasks in Braiil and Pernaround the tum of the century. We have'
found ,evidel1ce of burgeonihg professionalism in all the major Latin
'AmeriCan countries by the beginning of the twentieth century, whereas a quarter-century earlier itwas nonexistent.
What did professionalism mean? It meant that Latin America's
armed forces were being converted from political institutions into
military institutions. And the gradual elevation of the career of arms
into a respectable profession also meant that there were attracted to it
more responsible, patriotic, and dedicated types. Just as in the past,
the ne* cadets were drawn from the nonpropertied classes, but in- .
creasingly, ~echnical prdficiency and devoted patriotic service, rather
than political adventurism, were rewarded in a military career. Increasingly, then, we see in this period the .military academies of the
more advanced countries becoming filled with the serious, responsible
sons ofbrban professional and small business families, and the growth
of these truly professional arlnies served to reinforce the political calm
· that began to prevail in Latin America around the tum of the century.
It lasted until 1930.

RESURGENCE OF Mn.rtARISM .

THEN

SUDDENLY

IN 1930, a new wave of military intervention swept

the Latin American republics, and for the past thirty-five years the
political arena in virtually the whole area has become one in which
civilian, and military contestants have been fighting for control. What
explains the sudden resurgence of militarism in ,1930 just when' Latin
· America seemed on the verge of solving this problem? The precipita.ting factor is clear enough~name1Y7 the great world depression, which
hit Latin America particularly hard and buckled the fiscal foundations
and public support of civilian govemmenb throughout the area. As
a consequence, over half the governments of Latin America were
se¥ed by thea.rmed forces.
.'
.
l'Until recently, scholars have not only been confused over the issue
· of military motivation for political intervention but a.lso they have
failed to understand the political role the military have been playing.
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Indignant antimilitary historians have again allowed their hostility
to interfere with objectivs: appraisals and judgments. The most com.mon practice has been to explain the post-193° military intervention
as a simple reversion of armed-"forces officers tothe crude praetorianism
and vicious irresponsibility of the past--that is,that the always powerhungry military, which had been biding their time for years, took advantage of the opportunity, when ciVIlian governments were temporarily 'weakened by the shock of the great world depression, to seize
_power again, and ever since the officers have been unwilling to relin~
quish political power.
Our investigations of the -past decade, however, have resulted in
quite a different interpretatioq. What we ~ave done is to place the
whole problem. of military intervention in Batin America ,since 1930
in the broad context of the social reform problem. I believe it can be
demonstrated, the Mexican exception aside, that the first time a really
serious social crisis .hJt Latin Ameiicawas the depression year 1930,
and that th'C struggle to resolve it has been going on ever since. The
-deep military involvement in this social struggle is the key to-an explanation of armed-forces officers' politicalactions over the past thirtyfive years.
Now of course there is still to be explained the sudden eruption of
the sociopolitical crisis in .1930. Although in the )?eriod 1880'193°
economic developme~t and political progress took place, the tradi.-,
tiQnal social order was not seriously disturbed. But With immigration,
foreign investment,-and the technologiCal advances, whicK gavestimuIus to material progress and rapid urbanization, new ·social forces, such
as organized.labor and various middle-class groupings, were beginning
to emerge. These bad not made sufficient headway to disturb seriously
the soCioeconomic dominance of thelandedandeommercial oligarchy
-until the economic hardships of world .depression brought sudden
demands from the lower-income groups for an improvement in their
lot, demands expressed in the form of strikes, riots, and ugly mob '
.
demonstrations. ~
_ ~e initial response ofJthe military to thispressnre for social reforms from popular elements was to set up military governments and .
preserve order by use of f6rce. True, this resurgence of militariSm was
encouraged by the frightened oligarchy. But-the military were even
more frightened for themselves. If public order broke down3nd a
social upheaval oc~urred, thenthearmed..forces institutio~itself would
be destroyed~ iust as it was in Mexico a decade and. a half earlier. Thus.
J
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it was really to save their own skins that the officers seized political
power. When the depression hit at the beginning of 1930, rightist ,
military dictatorships were already in power in Cuba and Venezuela,
and during the ensuing two years, eight more such regimes were installed. This rightist-authorization political pattern generally prevailed
in Latin America until the end of World War II.
When the war broke out in Western Europe in 1939, more than
half of Latin America's twenty republics were ruled by conservative
military men, and in most of those countries where the armed forces
were not ruling directly, they were backing traditionalist civilian regimes., The net effect of WorId War II upon Latin Atnerican politics
was to freeze traditionalist regimes in power so long as the security of
the hemisphere was threatened. The wartime emergency provided
authorization regimes with justification for outlawing political experimentation and major social or economic reforms for the duration.
,Also, the United States, whose overriding concern was strategic, did
its best to maintain stability in Latin America, sought the cooperation
of all governments which were willing to aid the' war effort, and provided them with substantial military and economic aid.
And yet the war produced pressures which made maintenance of
the social status quo progressively more difficult. For one tliing, the
outbreak of hostilities seriously disturbed Latin America's economy.
The immediate shock, due to the transportation squeeze, was felt in
shortages, particularly of manufactured goods, but ,also of foodstuffs.
The sudden interruption of imports from Western Europe and 'the
United States gave a great new impetus to industrialization, but the
new wartime prosperity was not broadly based. Governments froze
wages, prohibited strikes, even outlawed labor movements in some
countries. Thus the hardships suffered by the lower- and middle-income groups intensified to the point where social stresses and strains
"
."
reached the breaking'point.
".Then an unexpected and unprecedented thing occurred. In country
after country, toward the end of World War II, radicaryoung officers
seized control of armed-forces organizations; then they made common
cause. with .popular elements, overthrew traditionalist "regimes, and
brought reform governments into power. The first such revolution
was led by Colonel Juan Per6n in Argentina in Jl.!ne -of 1943. Later
that same year, young officers in Bolivia conducted a similar kind of
revoll\tion. During 1944 popular revolutions led by young officers
occurred in Ecuador and Guatemala, and the same thing occurred in
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The Twelfth An~tial U.N.M. Research Lecture
DR. EDwm: LmuwEN, Chainnan of the department of history at the Uni-

t

versity, delivered the Twelfth Annual Research Le$Jre on Apnl 2, 1965.
He is known for his succesS" iIi building programs of specialized excellence
in the history~ language and· culture of Latin America.
.
Born in South Dakota, where he received his elementary and secondary
education, he was awardcq·his ba~ureate and doctoral degrees from tile
University of CaIifomia,Berkeley. For three years during World War Ii,
be Was a Navy lieutenant and, after. serving as an instructor on the University of California at Los Angeles history' faculty, he 'became Visiting Professor of Ameri~ History at the University of. Utrecht in the Netherlands.
He then returned to the University of California at Berkeley where he
taught Latin Altlerican History before entering government service as a
Staff Chief for Latin American Affairs. Since 1957 he has been a member
.
. and chairman of the history- faculty at UNM.
.As a scholar whose. principal contributions. have been in the field of
historicalres-earch on 4tin An;tericanmilitary institutions and as an authority on Venezue~ he has published six books and ~ore than twenty articles.
He bas been the rec:ipient of severaIresearch grants and has been awarded
fellowships by the University of California, the Doherty Foundation, the
Organization of American States, the FulbrigHtCommisSion, the -Carnegie .
.
and Rockefeller Foundations,and·the Council on Foreign Relations.
In addition to serving on many llI!iverSity committees, he has been a
consultant to the State and. Defense Deparhnents, to several private resear~horgan~tions, and.isa member of the American Historical Association,' Hispanic-American Historical Association and the Netherlands-American Fou~dation.
.
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it was really to save their own skins that. the officers seized political
power. When the depression hit at the beginning of 1930, rightist
military dictatorships were already in power in Cuba and Venezuela,
and during the ensuing two years, eight more· such regimes were in, stalled. This rightist-authorization political pattern generally prevailed
in Latin America until the end of World War II.
When the war broke out in Western Europe '-in 1939, more than
half of Latin America's twenty republics were ruled by conservative
military men, and- in most of those countries where the armed forces
were not ruling directly, they were backing traditionalist civilian regimes. The net effect of W orId War II upon Latin American politics
was to freeze traditionalist regimes in power so long as the security of
the hemisphere was threatened. The wartime emergency provided
authorization regimes with justification for outlawing political experimentation and major social or economic reforms for the duration.
Also, the United States, whose overriding concern was strategic, did
its best to maintain stability in Latin America, sought the cooperation
of all governments which were willing to aid the war effort, and provided them with substantial military and economic aid.
And yet· the war produced pressures which made maintenance of
the social status quo progressively more difficult. For one thing, the
outbreak ~f hostilities seriously disturbed Latin America's economy.
The immeQiate shock, due to the transportation squeeze, was felt in
shortages, particularly of manufactured goods, but also of foodstuffs.
The sudden interruption of imports from Western Europe and the
United States gave a great new impetus to industrialization, but the
new wartime prosperity was not broadly based. Governments froze'
.wages, prohibited strikes, even outlawed "labor movements in some
countries. Thus the hard·ships suffered by the lower- and middle-income groups intensified to the point where social stresses and strains
rea~hed the breaking point.
Then an unexpected and unprecedented thing occurred. In country
after country, toward the end of World War II, radical young officers
seized control of armed-forces organizations; then they made common
cause with popular elements, overthrew traditionalist regimes, and
brought reform governments. into power. The first such revolution
was led by Colonel Juan fer6n in Argentina in June of 1943. Later
that same year, young officers in Bolivia conducted a similar kind of
revolution. During 1944 popular revolutions led by young officers
occurred in 'Ecuador and Guatemala, and the same thing occurred in
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Venezuela in 1945. By 1953, reform-minded element's, eitherled by
the military or supported by them, took control in twelve of Latin
America7s twenty 'countries. Thus, we see the armed forces making a
determined effort to promote social reform. They clearly demon.strated, then, in the decade 1943-1953, that they were something more
than the mere agents of the oligarchy:
But then just as suddenly, as the wave of political change and social
reform seemed to be. carrying all before it, the political currents began to flow in the opposite direction, that is, there was counter-revolution, led by the military again, and· reaction. In fact, in the decade
1948-1958, which overlapped the military-reform decade of 1943-1953,
every single government of the reformist type was either overturned
or forced to adopt a much more moderate course. Generally speaking, the armed forces unmade the very revolutions they had launched
in the immediate post-World War II period. "Why? Well, riding the
breast of social reform proved to be a much more difficult job than
the military.rulers had anticipated. Pressures from the oligarchy and
the frightened upper-middle class against-any further leftwardevolution threatened to bring about a breakdown of law and order. Reform..
ist elements seemed to be trying to move too fast, too soon,· to deliberately widen social cleavages and provoke violenee. The lower-income
groups, encouraged by demagogic govemments, seemed to be getting
out of hand. Then too, the late 194ds witnessed the coming of the
Cold War fo Latin.America, and the Korean crisis of the early 1950's
made the Cold War even more intense. In the eyes of the armed
forces, the new international crisis called for political stability and a .
moratorium on the unsettling business of social reform~
In the late 19507s, as traditionalist or more moderate regimes were
restored to power, the military rulers once more withdrew from the ..
scene. Four of them were actually assassinated (Colonel· Rem6n in
Panama in 1955, General Somoza in-Nicaragua in i956, Colonel
Castillo Annas in Guatemala in 1957, and General Rafael Trujillo in
the Dominican RepUblic in 1961 ) and two were driven from power
(Perez Jimenez in Venezuela in 1958, and Batista in Cuba in 1959)
by the aroused populace.
However, Latin America is once more in the midst of resurgent
military role today. In the past three years, eight duly elected civilian
. governments have been overthrown by the armed forces. In- Argentina,
on March 30, 1962, they deposed President Arturo Frondizi and dismissed· Congress because they disapproved of election results which
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gave the followers of Per6n too much power. Three months later, the
. milit~ assumed power in Pern because they too disapproved of election resutts, results which gave reform' candidate Haya de la Torre a
plurality in the presidential race. They then ruled through: a military
junta for a full year until a president more acceptable to the armed
forces was elected by the Pernvian people. During 1963, four more
constitu~onal presidepts were displaced by the use of military forcein Guatemala, Ecuador, the Dominican Republic, and Honduras. In
April of 1964, Latin AmeriCa's largest country, Brazil, came under
military rule, and in November of 1964, the Bolivian vice-president, a
general, forced the civilian president out of the country and assumed
power himself.
.

THE MEANING OF CONTEMPORARY Mn.ITARISM

we are now in a position to
understand better the meaning of military interVention in contemporary Latin America. Certainly it is clear that political intervention by
the armed forces in Latin .America today is something more than
erode· praetorianism. The generals who, seize power today are no
longer the capricious ogres of the past, whose only interest seemed to
be in destroying civilian government and raiding the national treasury. On the contrary, the military are generally motivated by wha~.
they believe to be sincere patriotism. Their intervention, they believe,
is always in the national interest-to save their country or to protect
the armed-forces Institution, which they believe to be the very, embodiment of nationhood.
Normally, the armed forces will support the duly elected civilian
government, but the moment the situation departs from what they
view as normal, they begin to reexamine their position. If pub~c order
threatens to break down as a result of growing opposition to the poli:cies of the incumbent government, then the' military feel a constitutional duty to intervene, usually only temporarily, to provide' the
forces·I always
nation with a more viable" administration. The armed
.
disclaim any desire to exercise power themselves; they wish only to
guarantee that the civilians who exercise it are doing-itproperly in the
true national ipterest and are not perverting their functions.
Why are the military so active in Latin American politics today?
Why have they seen fit to depose eight civilia~ governptents over the
WITH

THI'S mSTQRICAL BACKGROUND,
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past three years? The explanation, I believe, lies in the military reaction to a sudden new intensification of the social crisis. The latter
has been provoked by two explosive new ingredients which have been .
pumped into the Latin American political vortex in just the past six
years. One is the Castro-Communist revolution in Cuba which began
in 1959, and the other is the United States AlUance for Progress program, which President Kennedy launched in 1961.
Consider first Castro's Cuba. The spectacle of Castro's utter destruction of Batista's arffiedforce and his summary execution of most
of the senior officers in Cuba (more than six hundred of them) filled
the hearts of their pro~sional brethren in the othef countries of
Latin America with horror and apprehension. They reCall today that
Cas~o started out as a moderate reformer, but that he surprised nearly
everyone with the violence and extremism that characterized the immediate aftermath of his victory. .As a result, military men in Latin
America today have come to -suspect any popular reform movement
as a potential threat to their own lives and institutions.'
A further cause for the armed forces' apprehension over their own
future is-strange as this may seem-the United States' formula fOf
stopping Castroism in Latin America-namely,. the Alliance for Progress. In the ~yes of the Latin American military, the United States
governmenfspublic advocacy of, and support for ~rash programs of
material development and social change cond~cted through the medium of authentically democratic governments is tantamount to encouraging politiCal chaos and social disintegration.. What the officers
fear is that the Alliance may provoke a vioient social upheaval in
which the military will be 'd~troyed as they were in Cuba. And that is
why they are intervening in politics today. They do not necessarily oppose social reform, but they~nsist that it be conducted at a pace moderate enough to avoid the tlreat of social revolution.
Although the military intervenors have, now retired from the political scene in two countries and are making preparations to do so in
the other six, all eight interventions of the past three years have had
profound political and social consequences upon the nations involved.
One obvious political result is a blow against democracy, for in every
single case, the successor regime that emanated, or will emanate, from
the military junta's interim rule is inevitably less representative than
the government it deposed. Whatever has emerged, or may emerge
in the way of new elections, new constitutions, and new governments
may be called democracy, but the military's veto against the return
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of the majority elements they ousted makes a mockery of that word.
A likely secondary political consequence of the military interventions
will be more military interventions, for the intervenors m~st now protect themselves against possible vengeance from resurgent democratic
forces.
But even more serious than the political consequences are the social
ones. For these eight military coups meant something far more than
the mere ouster of eight popularly elected presidents. More fundamentally, they meant the strengthening of social reaction. Even though
the military did not act at the behest of the propertied elite, their
actions, all the same, have had the effect of halting, or at least stalling,
broad programs of social reform advocated by the governments they
deposed, or by the governments they prevented from taking power.·
Thus it is the oligarchies that have reaped the benefits, at least temporarily, from the military coups. This social.consequence of military
intervention, I believe, raises a serious threat, both immediate and
long-range, to the success of the Alliance for Progress program, and
makes it more likely than ever that more violent revolutions of the
Cuban variety may well plague the Latin American area-and create
new headaches for the United States government-in the fUfure.
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